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## Taking the Second-Person Perspective Seriously in Social Cognition

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Much recent scholarship and research on social cognition continues to undervalue, misconceive, or ignore intersubjectivity, privileging first- and third-person perspectives (subject vs. observer) over the second-person perspective (a notable exception is Schilbach et al. 2013). Similarly, representation is often privileged over practice. Indeed, privileging representation and a third-person stance often go hand-in-hand. I consider two debates in the literature to demonstrate this dual privileging. 1) Mirror neurons, still touted by some to be *the* mechanism explaining social behavior, have recently been argued to play a more minimal role in social cognition (Spaulding 2013). Spaulding's argument nonetheless turns in part on what sorts of representations (sensory-motor but not mental, she argues) can be associated with mirror neuron activity. Even more interestingly, Heyes and others have argued that mirror neurons develop in the context of associative learning and that insofar as they have a role in social cognition, that functionality is socially constructed (Ray and Heyes 2011). In other words, the very phenomenon mirror neurons are supposed to explain may be constituting them. I argue that Heyes' account of mirror neurons is more compatible not only with interactive practice-based views of intersubjectivity, but also with extended or embodied mind theories that de-emphasize representational conceptions of the mind. The associative-learning account also opens the door for culture to play a more prominent role in social cognition. 2) The privileging of third- over second-person perspectives and representation over practice can be found even in some treatments of the so-called "direct perception" approach to understanding other minds (e.g. Lavelle 2012). This approach is intended to be an alternative to theory-theory and simulation accounts of understanding other minds. *Pace* Lavelle, I argue, first, that the direct perception of other's mental states must be understood as primarily a second-person interactive relation and only secondarily a third-person, observer-observed relation. Second, perception may or may not be representational, depending on what kind of state is perceived. To make this latter argument, I draw on a phenomenological analysis of the embodied practice of yoga. Yoga presents an ideal phenomenological case study because it involves both non-linguistic embodied and linguistically mediated (representational) knowledge. It is an inward-directed practice, yet the teacher-student relationship is outward-directed and requires *both* intersubjective interaction *and* observation of another. Yoga therefore allows us to differentiate between first-, second-, and third person perspectives and to gain a better understanding of the relationship between practice and representation.